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Local Governments in Portugal
José da Silva*
After more than three decades of democracy, local governments in
Portugal face new challenges with a significant increase in their
attributions as well as a new role they have to play as providers of local
public goods. Portuguese local governments have now the experience and
the organization to aspire to move from quantity to quality, production to
management, information asymmetry to transparency and accounta-
bility, monopoly to competition, growth to sustainability and bureaucracy
to simplicity. In this paper we present an overview of the way walked by
Portuguese local governments in the last three decades and we
characterize the present problems they face concerning their financing.
Después de más de tres décadas de democracia, los gobiernos locales en
Portugal  se enfrentan a muchos cambios derivados de un incremento
considerable de sus atribuciones, tales como el nuevo papel que han de
jugar como oferentes de bienes públicos locales. Los gobiernos locales
portugueses tienen ahora la experiencia y la organización necesarias
para aspirar a moverse de la cantidad a la calidad, de la producción a
la administración, de la información asimétrica a la transparencia y
responsabilidad, del monopolio a la competencia, creciendo en sosteni-
bilidad, y  de la burocracia a la sencillez. En este trabajo presentamos
una revisión del camino andado por los gobiernos locales portugueses
en las últimas tres décadas y caracterizamos los problemas presentes a
lo que han de enfrentarse relacionados, sobre todo, con su financiación.
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1. Introduction
After more than three decades of democracy, local governments in Por-
tugal face new challenges with a significant increase of attributions as
well as a new role as providers of local public goods. We may say that
local governments in Portugal reached a stage of maturity and face now
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a new task agenda. Local governments have now the experience and the
organization to aspire a shift from quantity to quality, production to mana-
gement, information asymmetry to transparency and accountability,
monopoly to competition, growth to sustainability, and bureaucracy to
simplicity.
The new agenda requires qualified human resources, an appropriate
institutional framework and the financial resources to cope with an incre-
ased sophistication in the provision of utilities to residents. In this
paper we will focus on the institutional framework of local govern-
ments as well as their search for new financial resources.  In section two
we present an overview of the path trodden by local governments since
1979 and we characterize local government finance in Portugal. In sec-
tion three we do a SWOT analysis of local governments financing con-
sidering the new challenges they face. In section four we analyse the agen-
da of local governments in the next decade and we present a set of
programs and policy measures at local level. Finally, we derive some con-
clusions.
2. Three decades of Democratic Local Governments in Portugal
Local Governments in Portugal have been conferred constitutional dig-
nity since 1976. Their attributions and competences are established by
the laws 159/99 and 169/99 modified by law 5-A/2002. Local governments
have their own personnel, patrimony and finances, and their adminis-
tration pertains to their political bodies. The central government only
has legal inspective powers in situations established by law. 
Portuguese local governments are composed by the administrative
regions, two autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira), 308 munici-
palities and 4259 freguesias. The administrative regions were not yet cre-
ated despite having been established by the Constitution of the Portu-
guese Republic. 
During the last three decades the number of municipalities has been
fairly stable (only three municipalities were created) despite the strong
movement in favor of secessions from existing municipalities. Portu-
guese municipalities differ in size, and this asymmetry has increased
as a consequence of emigration. As can be observed in table 1 between
1981 and 2005 the number of municipalities with less or equal to 5,000
residents has increased from 19 to 34. From 1981 to 2005 the number
of municipalities with less or equal to 10,000 residents increased by
twenty.
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Table 1. Portuguese Municipalities by Population Size
Population 1981 1986 1996 2005
Number % Number % Number % Number %
1 – 5,000 19 6.23 19 6.23 32 10.49 34 11.03
5,001 – 10,000 70 22.95 69 22.62 76 24.92 75 24.35
10,001 – 20,000 91 29.84 89 29.18 75 24.59 70 22.73
20,001 – 50,000 79 25.90 82 26.89 73 23.93 72 23.38
50,001 – 100,000 28 9.18 24 7.87 25 8.20 33 10.72
>100.000 18 5.90 22 7.21 24 7.87 24 7.79
Total 305 100.00 305 100.00 305 100.00 308 100.00
Source: Own calculations based on INE estimations.
1979 is an important date for local governments in Portugal. For the
first time a law regulates the finances of local governments. From then
on it has been subject to additions, amendments and several changes.
Presently, local government finances are regulated by the law 2/2007 chan-
ged by law 22-A/2007.
Despite the growing importance of local governments, the level of
decentralization of expenditure in Portugal is still small. In table 2 we
can observe that the percentage of expenditure of local governments in
total expenditure of general government was in 2006 below 13%.
Table 2. Expenditures of Local Governments as a Percentage of
Expenditures of General Government
Year %
1979 12.41
1987 10.40 
1996 11.52 
2005 13.10 
2006 12.99 
Source: Government Statistics, EUROSTAT.
An important feature of local governments and, in special, of muni-
cipal activity in Portugal is the percentage of resources devoted to invest-
ment. As we can observe in table 3, comparing 1987, 1996 and 2005, we
verify that annual investment is always above 32% of total annual muni-
cipal expenditure. 
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Table 3. Structure of Municipal Expenditures (%)
1987 1996                 2005
Current Expenditures:
Personnel 29.1 23.7 27.2
Goods and services 14.7 14.9 19.1
Current transfers 6.7 7.6 5.9
Other current expenditures 3.9 3.5 4.2
Subtotal  54.4 49.7 56.4
Capital Expenditures:
Investment 38.8 33.2 32.1
Capital transfers 4.1 5.6 6.0
Financial assets 0.3 2.1 1.0
Financial liabilities 2.3 9.3 4.2
Other capital expenditures 0.1 0.1 0.3
Sub-total 45.6 50.3 43.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Finanças Municipais - DGAA; Finanças das Administrações Públicas, INE.
Municipalities in Portugal depend heavily on inter-governmental
transfers. Despite the increase in the relative importance of direct
taxes, indirect taxes and user charges, and sale of goods and services in
municipal receipts, transfers (current and capital) account for more
than forty-five percent of total receipts in 2005. The growing importance
of debt is also a feature of the structural changes observed in the last
three decades concerning municipal financing. More restrictions on
municipal debt have been determined in recent years, and the decrea-
se of the importance of this source of income between 1996 and 2005
can be noted below.
Table 4. Structure of Municipal Receipts (%)
1987 1996            2005
Current Receipts:
Direct taxes + indirect  taxes + user charges 27.1 24.0 33.9
Sale of goods and services 7.4 12.6 9.0
Current transfers 30.4 19.2 22.3
Other current receipts 1.9 1.9 2.8
Subtotal  66.8 57.7 68.0
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Capital Receipts:                                                  1987            1996           2005
Capital transfers 26.0 26.6 21.7
Financial assets 0.1 1.4 0.4
Financial liabilities 3.7 11.6 4.8
Other capital receipts 3.4 2.7 5.1
Sub-total 33.2 42.3 32.0
Total 100.0 100.00 100.0
Source: Finanças Municipais - DGAA; Finanças das Administrações Públicas, INE.
Despite many changes introduced in the Law of Local Finance during
the last three decades, municipal financing in Portugal can be charac-
terized by five major features: 
i) The low level of municipal fiscal autonomy.
ii) The importance of real estate property as a fiscal basis for muni-
cipal taxes and user charges.
iii) The redistributive nature of intergovernmental grants, with poor
municipalities relying mainly on transfers from central government.
iv) The small, but increasing importance of fiscal competition among
municipalities.  
v) The importance of investments in the management of the politi-
cal business cycle. 
2.1. Low level of municipal fiscal autonomy
In table 5below local government’s fiscal autonomy is classified into eight levels. 
Table 5. Levels of Local Government Fiscal Autonomy
Level 1 Fiscal basis of local taxes set by municipalities.
Level 2 Fiscal basis of local taxes is not set by municipalities. Rates set by
municipalities.
Level 3 Fiscal basis of local taxes is not set by municipalities. Rates defined
by municipalities from a pre-determined range.
Level 4 Municipalities have the power to set user charges.
Level 5 Municipalities collect their own taxes but do not set their fiscal
basis or their rates. 
Level 6 Municipalities participate in central governments tax receipts 
(revenue sharing).
Level 7 Municipalities receive unconditional inter-governmental grants.
Level 8 Municipalities receive conditional inter-governmental grants.
58
Portuguese municipalities collect their own taxes and user charges,
collect fines, obtain receipts from the sale of goods and services, recei-
ve intergovernmental transfers, benefit from the sale of assets, receive
donations and inheritances, receive dividends and obtain loans. 
Two major local taxes in Portugal have the real estate property as a fis-
cal basis. One (IMI) is a tax on the real estate property and another one
(IMT) is a tax on the transfers of real estate property. In the former case,
municipalities can choose the rate from a range of rates. In the latter case,
the tax basis and the rates are not under the control of municipalities. 
Other municipal taxes are a tax on corporation income (DERRA-
MA) and part of the receipt of a tax on automobiles (Imposto Único
de Circulação). In the first case, municipalities may choose to collect
the DERRAMA, but the rate range is defined by central government.
In the second case the fiscal basis and rates are not under control of
municipalities.
Portuguese municipalities have an important fiscal autonomy con-
cerning the collection of user charges, but they have to show that there
is proportionality between the user charges and the cost or benefit asso-
ciated with the service that leads to the collection of those user charges.
Intergovernmental grants are mainly unconditional grants and their
total amount and distribution among municipalities are defined using
formulas ensuring that financial resources transferred to municipali-
ties are not subject to political manipulation. 
Considering the description above, we may conclude that Portugue-
se municipalities have a low level of fiscal autonomy: level 3 for some
taxes; level 4 for user charges; level 5 for some taxes; level 6 and 7 for
inter-governmental transfers; and level 8 for conditional inter-govern-
mental grants.
2.2. The importance of real estate property as a fiscal basis for muni-
cipal taxes and user charges
The need to ensure the neutrality principle in local government’s finan-
ces determines the use of taxes based on the benefit of tax payers. The
tax on real estate property (IMI) can be understood as a tax based on
the benefit of tax payers if the value of property is subject to frequent
updating. In such a case, municipal expenditures in amenities and
public infrastructure will contribute to the increase in the value of real
estate property and hence will lead to more tax receipts collected by the
municipality. The growth of tax payments will not determine voting with
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the feet by residents if there is proportionality between the increase in
resident’s benefits and the increase in resident’s local taxes. This type
of tax has the additional benefit of providing tax payers with the appro-
priate incentive to scrutinize the quality of governance at local level.
Additionally, a tax on real estate property is acceptable on equity
grounds.
The above arguments have been decisive to keep real estate property
as an important fiscal basis of municipal taxes in Portugal. There are short-
comings, though, namely the fact that real estate property is the basis
for two important municipal taxes and it is simultaneously the basis for
many user charges at local level. Therefore, there is the widespread fee-
ling that real estate property plays an excessive role on municipal finan-
ces causing two major negative effects: one is the permissive growth of
construction in Portuguese cities; another is the excessive fiscal burden
on housing.
In recent years municipalities benefit from the reform introduced in
municipal taxes on real estate property. This effect is observable on IMI
(municipal tax on real estate property) with receipts showing high rates
of growth. The growth of municipal fiscal receipts has generated an
opportunity for municipalities to diminish the rates of IMI, but the decre-
ase in the rates of IMI has been insufficient to avoid the growth of the
relative importance of real estate property as a fiscal basis at municipal
level. This result will become more probable after the approval of the new
Law of Local Finance that allows municipalities to give up to 5% of per-
sonnel income tax (IRS) collected from residents in their jurisdiction
as a way to foster local development. With this new alternative, it is likely
that the decrease in the rates of IMI will be smaller. Another consequence
of the reform on local real estate taxes is the increase in inequity among
Portuguese municipalities concerning their capacity to raise fiscal
receipts and its implication on the design of even more redistributive
inter-governmental transfers. 
2.3. The redistributive nature of intergovernmental grants
During the last three decades there has been several changes in the way
transfers from central government to municipalities are calculated. Des-
pite these changes, the general characteristics of the system have been
maintained. The amount of FEF (Financial Equilibrium Fund) to be
transferred to municipalities is calculated using a formula (in the pre-
sent it is equal to 25.3% of the average of the annual receipts of corpo-
60
rate income tax, personal income tax and value added tax). FEF is then
divided into two funds (a General Fund and a Cohesion Fund). In the
present, each fund receives 50% of FEF. 
The General Fund finances municipal expenses (provision of local
public goods and services). Therefore, it is distributed according to
population, area, and other cost factors. In the present 5% of the Gene-
ral Fund is distributed equally among all municipalities, 65% according
to population considering two correction factors for non permanent popu-
lation and scale economies, 20% or 25% is distributed according to
area, considering a correction factor for orography, and 5% or 10% is dis-
tributed considering the area of green zones under environmental pro-
tection (the latter case is applied when green zones under environ-
mental protection account for more than 70% of the territory of the
municipality). 
The Cohesion Fund is distributed with the purpose to benefit less deve-
loped municipalities contributing this way for economic and social
cohesion. Presently, this fund is subject to a correction by summing or
subtracting a fiscal compensation to account for differences in the
municipal tax basis. Municipalities with per capita municipal taxes abo-
ve 1.25 of national average have a negative fiscal compensation.  Muni-
cipalities with per capita municipal taxes below 0.75 of national avera-
ge have a positive fiscal compensation. The Cohesion Fund is distributed
according to an index of municipal social development compared with
the national average.
After the approval of the present Law of Local Finance, municipali-
ties will receive back 5% of IRS income tax collected from local residents.
Municipalities can decide to reduce this percentage benefiting tax payers.
This is an important change because it induces more fiscal competition
among municipalities.
As we can observe in table 6, presenting per capita central government
transfers to municipalities grouped by districts, FEF benefits much more
the small and less developed municipalities, located in less developed
districts (compare for example the per capita transfer of FEF to muni-
cipalities in the district of Bragança with the per capita transfer of FEF
to municipalities in the district of Lisbon). 
FSM is a fund set to finance education competences transferred from
central government to municipalities. Therefore, it has not a redistri-
butive purpose.
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Table 6. Central Government Transfers to Municipalities Aggrega-
ted by Districts - 2008 (euros)
Per capita Per capita Per capita Per capita 
FEF FSM transfer of IRS total transfer
Aveiro 153 16 25 195
Beja 621 14 21 657
Braga 155 18 20 193
Bragança 626 14 22 661
Castelo Branco 416 13 23 452
Coimbra 205 12 38 255
Évora 446 14 28 488
Faro 179 15 33 228
Guarda 535 14 19 569
Leiria 176 14 25 215
Lisboa 40 9 64 113
Portalegre 605 15 24 644
Porto 86 16 32 134
Santarém 249 14 25 288
Setúbal 89 14 37 139
Viana do Castelo 297 15 19 330
Vila Real 413 16 20 449
Viseu 343 17 20 380
Açores 350 23 24 396
Madeira 219 20 32 270
Source: OE2008
2.4 The increasing importance of fiscal competition among muni-
cipalities
Fiscal competition among municipalities is still low, but with the
reform of municipal real estate property taxes and the approval of the
new Law of Local Finance it will go up quickly. In the past, there was an
implicit equilibrium and the large majority of municipalities used to set
rates of IMI at their maximum. But, the increase in the value of real esta-
te property and a new perception by local executives of the benefits of
fiscal policies created an opportunity for lowering IMI and IRS to tax-
payers.
Concerning the IMI, two different ranges of rates were defined depen-
ding on recent evaluation of real estate property. The pressure to lower
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rates is higher for recently evaluated real estate property because IMI collec-
ted is much higher than in the case of non-evaluated real estate property.
As we can observe in tables 7 and 8, in 2007 more municipalities set the
maximum rate for non-evaluated property than for evaluated property.
The number of municipalities that set rates below its maximum is very
high for evaluated property.
Between 2007 and 2008, 30 municipalities lowered IMI rates for
non-evaluated real estate property (17 had in 2007 the maximum
rate) and 8 municipalities increased IMI rates. Concerning evalua-
ted real estate property, 49 municipalities lowered IMI rates (25 had
in 2007 the maximum rate) and 6 increased IMI rates. So, more and
more municipalities understand the importance of fiscal decisions to
foster municipal competitiveness and consequently fiscal competition
is increasing.
2.5. The importance of investment in the management of the politi-
cal business cycle
Many studies have been published concerning the political business
cycle at local level in Portugal. There is a solid empirical evidence that
local executives manage the political business cycle and that local
voters are more responsive to local investments rather than to qua-
lity of management indicators. The political pay-off of investments
created the conditions for an excessive orientation of local executi-
ves to invest on infra-structures and social equipments without assu-
ring the adequate operation conditions. If we consider this behavior
and the lack of scale of many municipalities, it is no surprise that
many local facilities have now low rates of use and some are short
of funds to operate. 
The last amendment to the Law of Local Finance considered this
diagnosis and new requirements on provision of information to local
voters and on accountability were established. Additionally, the new
restrictions on municipal debt have been raising public concern on
the financial soundness of municipal management, and consequently
in the last local election (2005), a few executives used the value for
money argument, providing extensive information on debt and qua-
lity of management. The electoral results obtained by those executi-
ves seem to confirm that such strategy worked out, and therefore it
is predictable that more local executives follow this strategy in the
future.
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Table 7. Rates of IMI - Non-Evaluated Real Estate Property (2007)
Non-Evaluated real estate
Rates of IMI Number of municipalities % 
50% of maximum rate 25 8.1
62.5% of maximum rate 6 2.0
68.75% of maximum rate 1 0.3
75% of maximum rate 50 16.2
80% of maximum rate 2 0.6
87.5% of maximum rate 80 26.0
90% of maximum rate 5 1.6
91.25% of maximum rate 1 0.3
95% of maximum rate 3 1.0
97.5% of maximum rate 2 0.6
Maximum rate 133 43.3
Total 308 100.0
Source :  Jornal de Negócios (base de dados)
Table 8. Rates of IMI - Evaluated Real Estate Property (2007)
Evaluated real estate
Rates of IMI Number of municipalities % 
40%  of maximum rate 33 10.7
50%  of maximum rate 1 0.3
60%  of maximum rate 48 15.9
70%  of maximum rate 18 5.9
75%  of maximum rate 1 0.3
76%  of maximum rate 1 0.3
80%  of maximum rate 88 28.6
85%  of maximum rate 3 1.0
86%  of maximum rate 1 0.3
90% of maximum rate 19 6.2
94% of maximum rate 2 0.6
95% of maximum rate 3 1.0
96% of maximum rate 1 0.3
Maximum rate 88 28.6
Total 308 100.0
Source : Jornal de Negócios (base de dados)
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The central government, understanding the need to set the required
incentives, is adopting a strategy to promote inter-municipal invest-
ment. In what concerns proximity public services, the National Strate-
gic Reference Framework (NSRF) imposed candidacies to be prepared by
groups of municipalities (at a NUTIII level).
The adoption of quality of management strategies by local executi-
ves is also a logical move because the basic needs concerning infrastructure
and social equipments are fairly satisfied. In table 9 we present the num-
ber of municipalities without social equipments for 2001 (consider that
since then many other investments were promoted). As we can observe
in this table, only a small percentage of municipalities do not have
equipments such as sports pavilions, swimming pools or libraries.
Table 9. Municipalities without equipments (2001)
Municipalities without 
Equipment at least one equipment % of total
Sports pavilion 69 22.4
Sports Field 27 8.8
Swimming pool 38 12.4
Children playground 45 14.6
Auditorium 77 25.0
Library 46 14.9
Museum 136 44.1
Market 27 8.8
Camping 191 62.0
Multipurpose Pavilion 135 43.8
Source :  A Administração Local em Números, DGAA.
3. SWOT Analysis of Municipal Finances
Diversity is a general characteristic of local government finances in Por-
tugal. Portuguese municipalities are very different concerning size, economic
basis, dependence on intergovernmental transfers and problems they face. 
For many municipalities, most of them located in the Interior of Con-
tinental Portugal, the overall picture is a loss of population and, there-
fore, a loss of fiscal basis, incapacity to attract residents despite the bet-
ter conditions of access to social equipments they offer, and difficulties
to cope with the reorganization of central government services in are-
as such us health, education, justice, safety, etc. 
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For some municipalities, major difficulties are associated with new
problems mainly generated by suburbanization of large cities, such as
crime, poverty, social exclusion, urban mismanagement, etc. For Lisbon
and Porto the difficulties are associated with loss of population, urban
decay, crime and social exclusion, urban sprawling, or others. Portuguese
municipalities, as a matter of fact, can be organized using the typology
presented by Ferrão (2003). There is a sleepy Portugal, a serene Portu-
gal, and a Portugal under pressure.
Many municipalities depend heavily on intergovernmental transfers
and such dependence will not change in the near future. Their efforts
will be mainly devoted to obtain gains by rationalizing expenditures
and by entering inter-municipal partnerships. Many others can act both
in the income and expenditure side. 
In the income side there is room for an increase in fiscal efficiency
(user charges) and for a growth of tax and user charges receipts (espe-
cially on IMI and new environmental user charges). In order to overco-
me debt restrictions, the importance of public-private partnerships is
going to increase and therefore special attention has to be devoted to
risk management. Voter’s scrutiny is going to increase and consequently
more efforts will be targeted by municipal executives to quality of mana-
gement and to communication with local residents. New taxes may
emerge, especially those with an environmental purpose. Special atten-
tion will be given by municipal executives to front-desk services and to
bureaucracy reduction. The generalisation of “municipal shops”, e-
government, and the impact of the so-called SIMPLEX, a de-bureaucra-
tisation programme, at local level may create better conditions for hig-
her fiscal efficiency and productivity. 
But many threats lie in the horizon of Portuguese local governments.
Economic restructuring may erode even more the economic basis of tra-
ditional industrial municipalities. Costs with maintenance and renewal
of equipments will increase in the future. European funds generated in
the past an opportunity for a high level of public investment. In the near
future (till 2013) NSRF will allow an identical level of public investment,
but is it not foreseeable that such level of financial boosting can be main-
tained from then on. Municipalities will have to incur in high renewal
and maintenance expenditures and do without this large amount of finan-
cial aid. 
Because of new restrictions on public debt, public-private partners-
hips have been one of the solutions to finance new investments. The main
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problem is that municipalities lack experience on this area and the sig-
ned contracts do not ensure an adequate share of project risks between
municipalities and private investors. 
Another solution was to use existing current expenditures as a
warranty for payment of new investments. This risk has been addressed
in the last amendment to the Law of Local Finances, and such practice
is today forbidden.
Small municipalities face an increased risk because of their past and
present inadequate policy concerning user charges. For example, user char-
ges for water supply are very low covering only a small part of costs. The-
se services are now in a process of reorganization. Supra-municipal com-
panies organized on a river-based logic sell or will sell water to
municipalities, (serviço em alta) and then municipalities provide the
distribution to local consumers (serviço em baixa) with the municipal
option to transfer this service to the supra-municipal company. In any
case the user charge is very low and has to be increased steadily creating
a political problem for those municipalities.
Table 10. Strengths and Weaknesses of Local Government Financing
Strengths Weaknesses
Richer municipalities have a Diffuse urbanization in many 
large fiscal basis. municipalities in the Littoral North and 
Littoral Centre of Continental Portugal.
Municipalities in the littoral Tax base insufficient in many low
North Littoral Centre still have populated municipalities.
a young population.
Growth of receipts in consequence Low levels of productivity of civil 
of the real estate property. servants.
Low level of user charges.
High level of municipal debt.
Urban growth can no more be the major
motivation for municipal receipts growth.
Increasing costs with the renewal of 
infrastructures and equipments.
Increasing costs with aging population.
Structural weakness of the Portuguese
economy.
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Table 11. Opportunities and Threats for Local Government Financing
Opportunities Threats 
Increasing receipts from IMI. Increasing restrictions on public debt.
New taxes (environmental taxes). Compromising future current receipts
with the financing of present capital
expenditures
Increase in fiscal efficiency.
Public-private partnership. Inadequate risk share in public-private
partnerships.
New public management. Economic restructuring longer than
expected and structural unemployment.
Gains of productivity in Increased sophistication of consumers
public services. of public goods and services.
E-government and modern Increasing costs with maintenance and
front-desk services. renewal of infrastructures and equipments.
Aging and loss of population.
Transfer of new competences to local
governments without the appropriate
financing.
4. An Agenda to Increase Municipal Efficiency and Accountability.
A democracy of over three decades furnished local governments in Por-
tugal with the appropriate experience, organization and human resour-
ces to face a new agenda of problems. Most municipalities in Portugal
can now aspire to move from quantity to quality, production to mana-
gement, information asymmetry to transparency and accountability,
monopoly to competition, growth to sustainability, and bureaucracy to
simplicity. This new agenda is consistent with innovation changes occur-
ring in Portugal namely the reform of public administration, the SIM-
PLEX program, the Plano Tecnológico and others. 
An important change is now under way concerning urban manage-
ment at municipal level. With the purpose of simplifying the process of
approval of new construction, a new law has been approved. The major
change introduced by this new law is the possibility of promoters, in pre-
arranged cases, to assume responsibility for following  municipal and
urban rules and to start works after a mere presentation of a pre-com-
munication (comunicação prévia). This is an important change for Por-
tuguese standards because it involves a posteriori instead of the tradi-
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tional a priori verification of compliance with urban rules. Some analysts
doubt the capacity of the judicial system to answer adequately to a
potential increase of situations of non-compliance with urban rules.
Another major change is a consequence of the approval of the new
General Regulation on User Charges where any change in user charges
has to be accompanied by an economic and financial study showing the
proportionality of user charges with the costs of services or with the bene-
fit of user charge payers.
Concerning the political process at local level, conversations betwe-
en the two major political parties (Socialist Party and Social Democra-
tic Party) have been under way in order that municipal executive coun-
cils must be constituted only by members of the most voted party. In
Portugal, municipal executives have been composed by councillors from
different parties, depending on electoral results (Hondt method) and
some authors argue that such device is unfit concerning efficiency and
efficacy of governance. Empirical studies show that the existence or not
of a majority and the need to obtain an absolute majority with a party
from the right or from the left influences the political business cycle and
the type of expenditures (current and capital expenditures), but there
is no clear evidence on the efficiency and efficacy superiority of abso-
lute majorities, comparing with relative majorities. This change in the
design of local executives does not benefit small parties. Nevertheless,
recent difficulties in the negotiations between the two major parties may
jeopardise this political reform at local level.
An important shortcoming for municipal action is the lack of a regio-
nal level in Continental Portugal. In a recent past, the solution was the
creation of municipal associations (great metropolitan areas, urban com-
munities and special-purpose municipal associations). This model is
now in a process of change because only the metropolitan areas of Lis-
bon and Porto as well as municipal associations with special purposes
will remain in the future. The central government is adopting the NUT
II and the NUT III map to organize central government services and to
induce municipalities to use this spatial organization in their candida-
cies to NSRF funds. Regionalization is not a consensus idea in Portugal,
although more and more politicians and specialists see this reform as a
way for less developed regions to overcome their difficulties (the North
region is a good example). Analysts see the reorganization of central
governments using these two maps as an intelligent way to create better
conditions for a future regionalization process of Continental Portugal. 
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A controversial issue in Portugal is municipal size. As can be infe-
rred from this paper, many municipalities are sparsely populated des-
pite the large jurisdiction areas. In large municipalities the size of
urban centres also creates movements of secession and in three cases
they were successful. To reorganize municipalities according to size is
not an easy task because of an emotional attachment of population to
their municipalities or freguesias and because of the recognition that
identity often overlaps with individual relations to territory. Moreover,
the concept that for politicians only vote counts matter is open to cri-
ticism. In under-populated areas an important role can be played by new
forms of public service organization. For example, the adequate scale
of services is, in a first stage, obtained by concentrating the same type
of service and, in a second stage, by concentrating related services. An
important role can also be played by new technologies. In large muni-
cipalities a new role can be played by freguesias in order to avoid seces-
sion movements.
A set of further organizational changes are under way or are still in
need to polish the agenda towards efficiency, to reduce bureaucracy and
to increase accountability. The following table shows a list of possible
changes, many of which are already in the agenda of innovative Portu-
guese municipalities. The implementation of mandate budgets, the
change in budget equilibrium rules, the creation of new taxes and the
introduction of a fiscal effort index in the distribution of the cohesion
fund are initiatives that require legislative changes and may raise coun-
ter-arguments. The generality of the other initiatives, in our view, bene-
fits from a generalized consensus, although some may be difficult to imple-
ment (cases of the zero-based budgets and the use of present value of
costs when deciding on contracts). Our view is that municipal executi-
ves leading the agenda will pass to voters a sign of competence and will
be rewarded in local elections. 
Table 12. Initiatives to Increase Municipal Efficiency and Accountability
Need of 
legislative 
Initiatives changes
1. To improve budget procedures
1.1. Mandate budgets. Yes
1.2. New budget equilibrium rules. Yes
1.3. Specialized commissions at Municipal Assembly level to Yes
analyse budget and to control budget execution.
1.4. Public debates on the municipal budget Yes
1.5. Zero-based budgets. No
1.6. To use the present value of costs in the selection of contractors. No
2. To increase management transparency
2.1. To evaluate in kind transfers. No 
2.2. To quantify non financial compromises. No
2.3. To publish management indicators No
2.4. To promote benchmarking studies of local services. No
2.5. To facilitate the understanding of municipal financial data. No
3. To reduce costs and bureaucracy
3.1. Re-engineering of internal procedures No
3.2. To favour  a posteriori verification of rules No
3.3. Integration of municipal information systems. No
3.4. To modernize front-desk services No
4. To increase fiscal receipts
4.1. To update user charges No
4.2. To control receipts of user charges No
(dividing into categories A/B/C)
4.3. Use of opportunity costs when defining user charges No
4.4. To increase municipal fiscal competitiveness No
4.5. Harmonization of tax rates and user charges at NUT III level No
to avoid zero or negative sum games.
4.6. To study the costs and benefits of tax collecting by municipality. No
4.7. To create taxes for environmental protection and other risks coverage Yes
4.8. To create user charges to fight traffic congestion No
5. To increase other municipal receipts
5.1. Correct use of public-private partnerships No
6. Municipal Debt
6.1. Use of public bonds. Yes
7. Changes in the Law Local Finances
7.1. Introduction of an index of fiscal effort in the estimation Yes
of the cohesion fund transfer 
8. Protection of tax-payers
8.1. Definition of quality standards for local public Depend on 
goods and services the services
8.2. To avoid export of user charges No
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5. Conclusion
Local governments in Portugal play an increasing role in the provision
of local public goods and services. Along the areas of traditional muni-
cipal competence, an important role is now played by local governments
on child-care and basic education (such as non-teaching staff, school
transports, food, curricula enrichment). But new areas of intervention
are expected to be added, namely basic health (non-medical staff of health
centers, maintenance expenditures of health centers, patient transpor-
tation, special health programs in health centers and schools). Costs
of these new attributions is financed by the fund FSM and the appro-
priate financial resources will predictably be at the disposal of local
governments. These are areas of intervention where central government
usually showed difficulties and consequently represent an important step-
up in expectations on the capacity of local governments to deliver good
public services to local residents.  
The referred step-up becomes even more ambitious when we consi-
der that simultaneously there is an increase in local resident demands
as well as in costs of operation and maintenance of infrastructure and
equipments. There is a window of opportunity for municipalities to face
this challenge with success. This window implies that during the pre-
sent period of EU funds, till 2013, municipalities may promote a new agen-
da of initiatives to assure cost rationalization, transparency of mana-
gement and accountability. After 2013 the expected increase in
maintenance and operating costs has to be addressed by modern and effi-
cient local governments without the present substantial amount of
financial help. It is crucial that municipal executives understand the stra-
tegic value of involvement in inter-municipal cooperation that in the
long-run may be instrumental in keeping autonomy and self-government,
given the evident lack of scale of many municipalities now.
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